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Abstract
Democratisation in post-Suharto Indonesia has significantly 
improved political participation, lifting expectation of bringing better 
political representation. However, various studies prove that such 
representation is unable to be immediately achieved since the existing 
democratic institutions remain dominated by oligarchic groups. The 
societal struggle to gain representation, therefore, is increasingly 
becoming a critical issue in contemporary Indonesian politics. This 
article discusses the dynamics of such struggle through the strategy 
that we have developed and called ‘mixed politics’. This refers to 
the blurring of borders between civil and political society, as well as 
formal and informal institutions.  
Introduction
The failure of Suharto’s centralised and authoritarian 
government to bring peace and prosperity has raised public demand 
for a better future for Indonesia through democratisation. Following 
the popular movement which, in 1998, forced Suharto to step 
down as president, the gate for democratisation has opened. The 
trajectory toward democracy is clearly shown in the liberalisation 
policies passed by the government in the initial period of political 
reform. Ranging from freedom of expression, freedom to organise 
and the staging of free and fair election, the policies have made it 
possible for Indonesians to gain a wider space in which to have their 
say and opinions heard. Mass media is more critical and free to 
publish or broadcast any matters concerning governance processes. 
Meanwhile, independent societal organisations have also popped 
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up in many areas. Of the most significant achievements in the 
development of Indonesian democracy has been the development of 
freer and fairer elections held in 1999, and subsequently followed 
in 2004 and 2009.
Indeed, procedural democracy in Indonesia has been strongly 
developed. Post-1998 elections have become important devices in 
Indonesian politics, allowing the people to get involved. Political 
parties and the legislature have also played a central role in 
influencing public policy and politics at both the national and local 
levels. Significant interest toward this growing new phenomenon has 
been dedicated by political researchers and commentators. Many 
recent works on democratic transitions in Indonesia have focused 
on the issues of procedural democracy and societal movements. We 
can see that studies on intermediary institutions, such as political 
parties, elections and civil society organisations, have mushroomed. 
Those works pay much attention to the emergence of competitive 
elections and the strengthening of societal organisations. 
Some studies conclude that Indonesian democracy is 
becoming more stable than in the initial stage of the reform, as 
demonstrated by the fact that the majority of voters have come down 
strongly on the side of the reform-oriented forces (Douglas, 2006). 
Some observers also believe that Indonesia has done exceptionally 
well in consolidating democracy (MacIntyre and Ramage, 2008 
as cited by Aspinall and Mietzner, 2010). Other works, however, 
contend that Indonesia’s new procedural democracy is now less 
consolidated and is not guided by effective government nor rule 
of law (Freedman, 2007), stemming from its recent history as an 
authoritarian state (Chadwick, 2006). Moreover, some scholars see 
that despite important institutional reforms, democratic change 
has been superficial. They argue that core structures of power 
have remained unchanged, with old oligarchic elites continuing 
to use the state and electoral processes for rent-seeking purposes 
(Robison and Hadiz, 2004).
Other studies also show that political reform provides fertile 
ground in which civil society can develop. Civil society organisations 
are now more active and dynamic in channeling societal interests. 
They have been effective in scrutinising government budgets, 
uncovering corruption scandals, and advocating urgently needed 
policies (Aspinall and Mietzner, 2010). In addition, civil society, 
especially non-government organisations (NGOs), has been seen 
mostly as a catalyst for democratisation (Aspinall and Mietzner, 
2010).
Despite the growing attention toward intermediary institutions 
as well as societal movements in post-1998 studies, studies on 
the role and dynamics of the state have also grown. This is due to 
the fact that the state has altered from being a single, atomic, and 
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closed actor, to being immersed in an arena where any actor can 
compete to gain control over it. The political reform has opened up 
the state and made it a contested arena. Consequently, this has 
blurred the separation between state, civil society, political society, 
and economic society. It is now difficult to clearly define the borders 
between these entities as they now all enter into the same arena – 
that of the state. 
In terms of democratisation, the recent liberalisation of the 
Indonesian political system has raised another question: how do 
the under-represented groups gain political access? Recent years 
have seen a growing phenomenon in which political space and 
opportunities are dominated by elites while, at the same time, under-
represented groups are left politically marginalised. Moreover, 
political institutions and systems are still poor and ineffective 
(Pratikno, 2009a). This situation has forced many political actors 
to expand their strategies in an effort to achieve wider and deeper 
representation.
This article argues that the struggle of political actors to 
gain representation by expanding their strategies has blurred the 
boundaries between state, civil society and political society. Civil 
society activists do not limit themselves on using civil society way  in 
influencing the state, instead try to support their political candidate 
or even to run on election. While this indicate the expansion of 
strategies to gain representation, these efforts may bring both 
positive and negative implications for Indonesian democracy. On 
the one hand, the expansion of these strategies can be viewed as 
a way for political actors to deal with poor political representation 
and improve the quality of democracy. On the other hand, this 
approach could potentially lead to more complicated problems for 
Indonesian democracy, especially by opening up the possibility of 
non-democratic actors to hijack democratic institutions.
The contribution of the efforts to deepen democracy is still 
difficult to assess. Nevertheless, more attention should be paid to 
the ways in which societal groups access the state – particularly 
those groups located on the blurred border between civil society, 
economic society, political society – as well as the implications for 
democratisation. Institutionalisation of this strategy may lead to 
posing a methodological question of how political science treats the 
separation of civil and political societies.
From closed to open state
Attention on the state has been the focus of Indonesian 
political studies for a long time. Studies on the centralised and 
authoritarian Suharto regime have been dominated discussions on 
the state as an atomic and closed institution. The New Order state 
has, therefore, been regarded as a powerful actor which determined 
political and economic trajectories.
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A range of labels have been given to the regime – from, but not 
limited to, a ‘bureaucratic polity’, ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’, 
and to ‘corporatist state’. One of the most popular labels for the New 
Order state was that of bureaucratic polity, which was developed 
in the work of Karl Jackson (1978). Bureaucratic polity refers to a 
system in which a limited group of senior bureaucrats, technocrats, 
and military officers participate in authoritative decision making. 
The policy outcome tends to reflect the interests and values of 
this relatively closed and elite group. According to this view, 
competition for real political power in Jakarta was restricted to the 
top bureaucratic and military echelons. 
The concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism, which was 
initially introduced by   Guillermo O’Donnel and Phillipe Schmitter, 
sought to explain authoritarianism in Latin America. According to 
Mochtar Mas’oed (1989), Indonesia’s bureaucratic authoritarianism 
was characterised by: (1) a  government  strongly  controlled  by 
a military which cooperated with civilian technocrats; (2) support 
for this system by   oligopolistic entrepreneurs in cooperation with 
international business; (3) policy making dominated by bureaucratic 
and technocratic approaches to avoid a long bargaining process 
among interest groups; (4) depolitized masses; (5) use of violence 
and control of opposition by the government.
The centrality of the state in studies of the New Order is 
also shown through the idea of state corporatism (MacIntyre, 
1994; Reeve, 1990). State corporatism was conducted through 
the channeling of political forces and interests into government-
sponsored and government-controlled organisations. This was 
shown by the domination of the Golkar Party – the ruling party. 
Similarly, most of the official interest organisations had to be 
organised under the governmental umbrella. Through such 
arrangements, the New Order state could easily control societal 
organisations in order to maintain its domination. In Reeve’s study 
(1990), corporatist representation in modern Indonesia was seen as 
growing out of an integralist conception of the state and the ‘family 
principle’, or kekeluargaan. He argued that such principles were 
part of traditional Indonesian political thinking in which society 
was conceived as an organic entity under the integrating and 
benevolent leadership of the state.
All those labels – bureaucratic polity, bureaucratic 
authoritarianism, corporatist state, etc – provide a clear picture of 
how political scientists emphasised the role of the state in Indonesian 
politics.  However, the strengthening of social movements in 
the mid 1990s had influenced a switch in the attention of many 
Indonesianists to instead focus on societal dynamics. We can 
witness how the academic discussions on civil society and social 
movement grew rapidly in this period. Among those who immersed 
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themselves in these studies were A.S. Hikam (1997), Phillip Eldridge 
(1989), Mansour Fakih (1994), and Arief Budiman (1990). Their 
works have depicted the greater concerns of society at that time.  
Open state, but oligarchic and hijacked
The peak in the attention toward society, especially 
political society and civil society, took place in the early stages 
of democratisation  after 1998. The fall of Suharto marked the 
initial reform stage in Indonesian, in which political society and 
civil society were allowed to play a more significant role in politics. 
Following Suharto’s fall, a strong determination to reform the ruling 
class structure was demonstrated through the establishment of a 
competitive multi-party system, as well as the implementation of 
decentralisation policy.
Political reform has brought a crucial transformation to 
Indonesia. And this, of course, is effecting change in the nature of 
Indonesian political study. Decentralisation, as well as elections 
and party-system reform, has altered the features of the state from 
being single, solid, and closed, to instead being more pluralistic, 
fluid, and open. The state can be accessed – or contested – by various 
actors. Interestingly, the field is not solely located at the national 
level, but is also dispersed at the local level where it involves more 
societal actors. Not surprisingly, as a result, more attention in the 
study of Indonesian politics after 1998 has been directed toward 
society.
The primacy of the society dimension in contemporary 
Indonesian studies is, in fact, influenced by increasing anti-state 
sentiment among citizens. The domination of the state for such a 
long time in everyday life has encouraged people to be more active 
in politics in order to minimise or even weaken the state. This 
sentiment has also been strengthened by the growing development 
of programmes by international donors which aim to reduce the 
state’s roles and to empower society. The most apparent programme 
area is good governance, which primarily targets reforming of the 
state. This situation has, of course, created a tendency in post-
1998 studies putting the state at the opposite side of the society. 
It also sets borders between them, earmarking them as different 
actors and in different arenas. This tendency is mirrored by the 
growing work on political participation, social movement, and civil 
society. 
Despite of the growing attention of scholars toward societal 
factors, analysts who regard the state as an arena and those who 
consider it as a prominent actor hold a shared awareness that 
the state’s role remains significant. Recent studies on Indonesian 
politics have treated the state as not merely an actor – in the like 
of the New Order period – but as an arena in which various actors 
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can get enter. For some observers, the importance of analysing the 
state can be traced from the elections and party-system reforms, 
and also  decentralisation policies (see Robison and Hadiz, 2004; 
van Klinken, 2002). These reforms are seen as providing crucial 
entry points for political actors to transform the state. 
In fact, those reforms have decentralised power horizontally 
and vertically. Horizontally, the policies aim to empower legislative 
bodies at the expense of the executive. Vertically, the central 
government is required to share its authority with local governments. 
These reforms have resulted in serious implications for political 
transformation within Indonesia. Political parties, competitive 
elections and parliaments have become vehicles, as well as arenas, 
for competing power among new and old political actors aiming 
to gain control over state. At the same time, decentralisation has 
spatially dispersed the field of contestation to the local level, where 
local elites play a more significant role in dragging power and 
resources. Such transformation makes the local scene a new and 
promising political field. Will this transformation result in Indonesia 
becoming more democratic? 
A shared belief among many observers and agencies holds 
that there is a natural correlation between decentralisation and 
democracy. This is, for instance, propagated the World Bank 
and USAID. They argue that decentralisation will positively effect 
democratic development. It is an argument based on the belief that 
decentralisation offers the prospect of increased accountability to 
citizens and taxpayers through greater accessibility to decision 
making (World Bank, 2000 as cited by Devas, 2005: 1). Some 
scholars, including Smith (1985) and Wolman (1990), believe 
that decentralisation can enhance local democracy because it 
promotes: (1) political values through political education, political 
stability, enhanced quality of politicians, and political equality; (2) 
governance values through enhanced accountability, government 
responsiveness, improved decision making and inter-organisational 
coordination); (3) efficiency values  through the promotion of 
competition derived from institutional pluralism (Smith and 
Wolman, as cited by Kulipossa, 2004). This argument, however, is 
debatable. 
In fact, we can see that there is on occasion a problematic 
correlation between decentralisation and democratisation. In the 
case of Indonesia, political liberalisation has, to some extent, 
created problems of representation and access. Instead of creating 
a more democratic and representative politics at the local level, 
decentralisation provides a new arena of power for oligarchic 
alliances. Decentralisation is hijacked and manipulated by elites, 
hampering the development of substantive democracy, prosperity, 
and wide representation. 
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The dynamics of local politics in the era of decentralisation 
have mirrored those at the national level, both in terms of the 
essential predatory logic and in the appropriation of the institutions 
of democracy primarily by interests nurtured by the New Order 
(Hadiz, 2004). While important changes have occurred within local 
power structures, New Order-era bureaucrats have succeeded in 
re-establishing themselves as local chief executives. Indonesia’s 
decentralisation is producing local governments that are more 
likely to be captured by elites than held accountable to local voters 
(Malley, 2003). 
This article shows that even though the state has become 
more open and accessible, political liberalisation has allowed for 
old and new elites to capture new institutions and procedures. 
This has enabled them to maintain their power and gain political 
and economic influence. However, liberalisation has produced a 
difference in the nature of the old and recent oligarchy – that is 
in terms of its plurality. While in the New Order era the oligarchy 
was solid and singular in character, it is now more dispersed and 
combined with new actors/elites. Either at national or local level, 
the old elites and oligarchs are entering into all possible ways of 
maintaining their involvement in political processes (Robison and 
Hadiz, 2004).  
Looking at the local level, these oligarchic elites can often 
be seen making use of local identity and violence to gain power. 
Local elites have used the opening of democratic space to dominate 
public discourse – especially when it comes to local pride. Van 
Klinken’s work (2001) on the emerging role of local elites in post-
authoritarian Indonesia has showed that post-New Order local 
politics as highly influenced by anti-democratic elites who have 
taken benefit from liberalisation. Local elites are at home in their 
surroundings because they are patrons to many poor clients. They 
exercise hegemony through numerous religious, political, regional, 
and occupational organisations (van Klinken, 2009). Borrowing a 
term used by Kanchan Chandra in India, Indonesian politics can 
be seen as patronage democracy.  
At the national level, we can also see how political processes 
are dominated by both new and old elites. Having been the pillars 
of the New Order government, bureaucrats, military officers, and 
politicians have now re-organised their political and economic 
power within the new system. Two surveys conducted by Demos 
in 2004 and 2007 underlined this argument. By interviewing many 
pro-democracy actors in Indonesia, Demos’ surveys found that 
those who were in power were mostly old and new elites from state 
and political society organisations – namely bureaucrats, public 
officials, politicians, and parliamentary members.The proportion 
counted for less than 60 per cent in the 2003-2004 survey and 
increased to 70 per cent in 2007 (See Samadhi and Warouw,eds., 
2009).
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Table 1. Composition of actors in power according 
2003/2004 and 2007 surveys
No Category of actors in powerbased on their background
2003/2004 survey
(n=1.795)
2007 survey
(n=1.945)
Percentage
1. Bureaucrats,government 40 46
2. Political parties and members of 
parliaments (local and national)
17 23
3. Religious, ethnic, indigenous 
groups
12 9
4. Police and military, thugs and 
militia
16 7
5. Business 12 6
6. Professional 0 5
7. Miscellaneous 2 5
Source: Samadhi and Warouw,eds., 2009. In each survey, respondents were asked 
to identify three actors in power who were regarded as actors who possessed actual 
and significant power. 
This is evidence that the old actors at the national level 
have not been expelled from politics but, in fact, have maintained 
a role in and dominated the new politics through new political 
vehicles (Robison and Hadiz, 2004). This capture of the state is 
a perpetuating predatory logic, political corruption, and poor and 
ineffective performance of political institutions. It means that some 
crucial problems of previous regime, such as low representation 
and political corruption, may remain.
Nordholt (2004) called this phenomenon disjunctive 
democracy. This model is marked by the establishment of 
electoral democracy and characterised by political violence and 
criminalisation of the state and other political institutions (Nordholt, 
2004). In decentralisation, for example, the absence of rule of law 
has made it possible for local strongmen to become involved in 
organised corruption, black economies, and crime by making use 
of democratic institutions. Close relations between bureaucrats, 
politicians, police, military, and criminals are also a feature of 
disjunctive democracy. 
Recent studies have showed that although democratisation 
and decentralisation have provided new procedures and 
mechanisms to compete for power, the marginal groups have been 
unable to gain access to the new and open state. A democratising 
state remains the domain of oligarchic elites, hindering the potential 
for other political actors to improve their political representation. 
This situation causes people to become sceptical about democratic 
institutions. This desperation can be seen, for instance, by the 
resistance of grass-roots voters in local elections and through the 
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increasing rate of non-participation. Grass-roots voters have tried to 
find a way to limit the elite’s domination of local elections (Pratikno, 
2009). Based on this fact, it is then important to scrutinise how 
political actors are represented and gain access to the state in an 
oligarchic- and elite-dominated arena.
Expanding strategies (1): 
Mixed politics between formal and informal institutions
In the most common conception, democracy is defined as the 
process of channeling a great amount and variety of public opinion 
into a smaller, more homogeneous number of elected representatives 
charged with carrying out the plurality’s preferences (Luna and 
Zechmeister, 2005: 388). However, this idea is seen as problematic 
because, as in many cases, the formal representative institutions 
fail to channel, act for and represent public interest. This is because 
the institutions are driven by the logic of informality, leading to the 
growing concern about the role of informal institutions/channels 
in politics. 
The struggle to gain political representation among actors in 
Indonesia has significantly increased. The state and other formal 
political institutions have become the target of political contestation 
for various actors seeking to access formal institutions such as 
political parties and parliament. A shared belief existed among 
people in the early years of reform, holding that political liberalisation 
would enhance opportunities for wider public participation and 
representation. In short, competition to gain power over the state, 
as well as formal institution, has been seen as a key to improve 
their political position. 
A long list of cases of evidence can be proposed to support 
that argument. Previously noiseless and repressed individuals, 
groups, and communities are becoming outspoken, active and 
forthright political actors. Religious groups, customary institutions, 
regional political assemblies, and ethnic identity groups are 
combating state institutions and conflicting among each other. At 
the same time, modern and formal political institutions – originally 
state-established, state-sponsored or, at least, state-promoted 
institutions – are finding it difficult to develop political legitimacy. 
Political contestation is, therefore, becoming very complex, involving 
several agents internal of society, internal of the state, and between 
society and the state.
 In such a situation, we cannot imagine that the installation 
of democracy will automatically make formal political institutions 
work as people expect. As demonstrated by some studies, most of 
the real political processes take place not in the formal institutions 
but through informal procedures, actors, and mechanisms. 
Modern formal institutions do exist but they are highly influenced 
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by informality – through, for instance, traditional and personal 
politics. Based on this fact, some scholars argue that it is vital to 
comprehend the informality of Indonesian politics. Nordholt (2004) 
proposes to understand the contemporary state as the product 
of continuities in patrimonial patterns and various arrangements 
linking formal institutions and informal networks. 
The most apparent example of informality in Indonesian 
politics is the phenomenon of pilkada, or local election. In the New 
Order era local heads of government (governor, regent/mayor) 
were appointed by the central government, sometimes overlooking 
local aspirations. Political reform brought significant change. A 
regulation on local government was passed in 1999 allowing local 
people to elect their own heads of government through local regional 
parliamentary members. In 2004, this regulation was subsequently 
amended to allow the election of governor, regent/mayor by local 
people.
  In many areas, one of the key successes for a candidate to 
win an election lies not only on their ability to mobilise support from 
political parties, but also traditional and primordial networks such 
as religious, ethnic, or mafia groups. Mixed politics – a combination 
of formal and informal ways – plays a significant role in pilkada. As 
a result, local elections have inevitably become political battlefields 
among dominant actors characterised by ethnic, religious and/or 
historical and cultural sentiments. 
The mixed politics between formal and informal institutions 
can be clearly observed in the role of Jawara in Banten local 
elections, particularly in the case of the governor election. Jawara 
is a traditional group whose members are attached through their 
martial arts skills. During the colonial era, this traditional group 
established a network in society to fight against the colonial 
government. In modern times, following political reform, this 
group has re-organised its network of violence to enter into formal 
institutions. Some studies have found that the influence of Jawara 
in local politics is highly significant. Even crucial decisions and 
policies are being decided by Jawara bosses –known as Abah. 
According to Abdul Hamid (2006):
When asked by a journalist whether the Governor of 
Banten is under his shadow, Abah said: “No, not like that. 
I just say my opinion to him. If he does something wrong 
in managing government in Banten, I just ask him to go 
in the right direction. I supported him when he ran for the 
governor. If he does something wrong then it will affect me. 
It will be such a shame for me. If he is unable to manage 
the government, it is better for him to step down. For me, 
he is nothing.”
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The remark shows that even though local heads of government 
are elected through formal channels, in fact personal and traditional 
politics still matter to some extent. The success of the incumbent 
governor in winning the position is highly influenced by the support 
of the Jawara network. Also, the leader of Jawara has much power 
in pressuring the governor. 
In such situations, true political representation is remarkably 
difficult for most people to obtain because institutions remain 
dominated by traditional networks and local bosses. Consequently, 
formal democratic institutions cannot be expected to be an arena for 
political representation. Those who occupy these networks benefit, 
politically and economically, from the system, while the rest remain 
marginalised and under-represented.
 Informality also occurs in the case of pemekaran. Though 
decentralisation, local governments have been allowed to split or 
merge their administration. In the recent years, the creation of new 
local administrations, or so called pemekaran, has taken place 
in many areas. This has led to the expansion and development 
of autonomous districts. Nordholt (2003) argued that the reason 
for the rapid increase of districts was primarily due to political 
ambitions of regional elites and the flow of funds they wanted to 
control, in combination with the interests of political parties at the 
national level.
This argument is in line with the finding of some research 
conducted by Master Program on Local Politics and Regional 
Autonomy, Universitas Gadjah Mada from 2006 to 2008. These 
finding argues that the demand for regional sub dividing in some 
districts occurred as a way for both traditional elites – local 
aristocracy, indigenous group leaders, etc – and local state actors 
– bureaucrats, local legislators, etc – to re-organise their economic 
and political power. Pemekaran, which ideally would be intended 
to create better government and public services, has been used 
instead as a political instrument for some local bureaucrats, ethnic 
groups, clans, or religious groups to gain political and economic 
resources from the state. The establishment of new districts or 
provinces has, to some extent, served both traditional and modern 
elites in expanding new political and economic arenas. 
Expanding strategies (2): 
Mixed politics between political society and civil society
In an elitist and oligarchic milieu, today’s formal democracy 
does not work properly. Instead, it makes the struggle for political 
representation exceedingly difficult. Given what has happened 
recently, this situation raises the question of how ordinary people can 
gain access to the state while formal democracy is being ‘hijacked’ 
by national and local elites. The dysfunctional nature of formal 
democracy demands these inquiries into political representation.
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Theoretically, when countries democratise opportunities arise 
for individuals and groups to become substantively more represented 
and involved in policy-making processes. However, the fact that 
democratisation can lead to less representation for some citizens 
and groups is, in principle, not terribly surprising (Shadlen, 2004). 
In his study on small industries in Mexico, Shadlen demonstrated 
that democratisation and the weakening of the corporatist state did 
not ensure better representation for everyone. For Shadlen (2004), 
democracy made representation important, but regime change 
itself could not ultimately guarantee representation.  
Indonesian democratisation provides a similar case study. 
Many societal groups in the reform era have become marginalised 
and under-represented. For some groups, the remedy for this 
illness is found in some of the alternative political approaches which 
increasing characterise Indonesian politics. When people are not in 
some way attached to the system, then they define politics in their 
own ways. An air of desperation can lead these actors to seek other 
ways of representation. These new ways are considered responses 
to the failure of formal democratic institutions in delivering a more 
substantive democracy. 
We are now witnessing how civil society organisation can 
build pressure through political society in order to create wider and 
deeper political representation by involving themselves in political 
parties and running for political offices. They believe that entering 
formal politics – some activists use term ‘going politics’ – may 
improve political representation. By arguing that Indonesian NGOs 
have much experience in conducting political education and are 
viewed as populist and clean compared to existing political parties, 
activists such as Ivan Hadar have even proposed to transform NGOs 
into political parties (see Sinar Harapan, February 13th, 2006).
  This proposal, of course, raises debate among activists as 
well as scholars. Boni Hargens, for instance, is against the idea. 
He believes that the boundaries between civil society, market, 
and state are clear, with these sectors having their own roles and 
functions. He wrote that NGOs should not become involved in 
formal politics. Instead, they should stand outside formal politics 
and play their role in criticising, supporting, or even fighting against 
government policies which were deemed to be not appropriate and 
not in keeping with community interests and aspirations (Hargens, 
in Sinar Harapan, February 13th, 2006). 
To some extent Hargens’ argument is problematic because 
much of the evidence shows that the opposite is the case – the 
boundaries are, in fact, increasingly becoming blurred. The Kompas 
newspaper (January 22, 2003) wrote:
There are a lot of NGO activists who change their profession, 
beliefs, and political orientations. We can see how human 
rights activists turn into the advocates of the New Order’s 
131
PCD Journal Vol. II, No. 1 2010
general who violated human rights and so on. However, the 
public still recognises them as NGO activists – apart from 
their effort to maintain their image as activists. There are 
also many newly made or partisan NGOs which are created 
to support political parties and rulers, as well as to fight 
against popular movements.
An example of the blurring of civil society, state, and political 
society can be found in the case of FPPB (Forum Perjuangan Petani 
Batang or Batang Peasants Movement Forum) (Kamajaya, 2007). 
During the New Order, the FPPB committed itself to being a civil 
society organisation by organising political movements at the 
local level. It was an underground movement in Batang, Central 
Java, which fought against the government to regain their land by 
conducting silent discussion as well as political education. 
The FPPB continues its strategy today while combining it 
with an effort to gain political office. The organisation is a strong 
and influential one in terms of its social network and leadership. 
This has made FPPB confident in organising its cadres to obtain 
political office – roles including village executive leader, or kades, 
local parliamentarian, and district executive leader, or pilkada. 
In short, the organisation’s members are now entering the state 
to influence and to democratise local politics. FPPB believes that 
democratisation can be achieved not only through the ‘civil society 
way’, but also ‘political society way’ and even ‘state way’. 
The strategy of civil society organisations and activists in ‘going 
politics’ can also be seen in the case of Gerakan Pancur Kasih in 
West Kalimantan (Iswari, 2010). This organisation was established 
to deal with poverty and economic problems of local people through 
a credit union. Membership has grown dramatically in the past two 
decades. Iswari’s study (2010) showed that in 2005-2006 almost 
60 per cent of voters in West Kalimantan had membership with the 
Pancur Kasih credit union. Seeing that this membership had the 
potential to be converted into political support, some prominent 
activists in the organisation tried to run for political office. 
Both cases provide an illustration of how many civil society 
actors try to enter the state and political society. However, both 
cases also show that the results are far from what might be expected. 
In both cases, members of the FPPB and Pancur Kasih were unable 
to compete effectively in political society. In failing to win enough 
voter support, candidates from both organisations were eventually 
consumed by complicated internal conflicts. To some extent, this 
situation has weakened their legitimacy and influence in local 
politics.
The involvement of the activists in formal politics not only 
brings complications to civil society organisations, but also blurs 
the boundaries of pro- and anti-democracy actors. There are many 
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cases which show that former civil society activists have now mixed 
with old oligarchs and other elites. This has made for confusion in 
identifying pro and anti democrats. Some NGO activists may be 
part of the oligarchic groups, whilst some politicians in the state 
institutions may be originally part of the civil society movement 
(Priyono, et.al., 2007).
This argument is in line with Robison and Hadiz’s study (2004) 
in North Sumatra. Their work showed how societal organisations 
could become involved in democratic institutions. 
In North Sumatera, however, protection rackets — as 
well as illegal gambling and prostitution — still appear to 
be the domain of old New Order-backed youth/gangster 
organisations like Pemuda Pancasila, and the powerful 
Ikatan Pemuda Karya. It is significant that a number 
of such organisations’ members currently occupy local 
parliament seats. It is also significant that activists of 
these organisations, with historic links to both military and 
Golkar, have frequently migrated with ease to other parties, 
including PAN and PDI-P.
These gangster organisations re-organise their power by 
making use of democratic institutions. Political parties and 
parliaments consist of not only pro democrats, but also anti 
democrats. In such a context, real political representation for people 
is far from what is expected. Instead of improving representation, 
expanding strategies of political actors are captured by old and 
new elites to maintain their power as well as to gain political and 
economic influences.
Expanding strategies (3): 
A solution for representation?
Contemporary Indonesian politics is marked by the blurring of 
boundaries and the expanding strategies of political actors. On the 
one hand, the expanding strategies are seen as a way for political 
actors to deal with poor political representation as well as to improve 
the quality of democracy. On the other hand, it potentially leads 
to more complicated problems for Indonesia’s democracy because 
it opens up the possibility for non-democratic actors to hijack 
democratic institutions. The blurring of boundaries between state/
society and formal/informal, therefore, generates more questions 
for those who wish to understand Indonesian politics deeply. How 
can this phenomenon be explained? Do the expanding strategies of 
political actors support democratisation? Do they provide a solution 
or result in new problems for political representation? 
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Recent studies on Indonesian politics have been strongly 
influenced by the logic of transition, in which all political 
phenomena in the post-New Order era are comprehended as the 
result of decentralisation and liberalisation. The existing political 
problems are seen as part of a transitional phase towards a more 
stable democracy. However, some criticise this perspective (see, 
for example, Nordholt and van Klinken, eds., 2005). The logic of 
transition overlooks the fact that what happens at the local and 
national levels of politics is, to some extent, influenced by so called 
path dependent processes. Historical processes, as well as social 
structures, matter in the development of recent Indonesian politics. 
History and local context cannot, therefore, be neglected – what 
happens today is the continuity of the past. Following this view, 
the mixed politics and blurred borders of Indonesian politics can 
also be traced in the localised histories. As asserted by Nordholt 
(2004), conventional distinctions between state and society, state 
and market, formal and informal relationships, and centre and 
periphery, should be reviewed critically. 
The efforts of political actors to expand their strategies can be 
seen as a way to politicise opportunities. However, the expanding 
strategies are influenced by social structures and historical paths. 
In such situations, the efforts of political actors to deal with poor 
political representation and improve the quality of democracy, 
faces some obstacles – namely old oligarchic structures rooted in 
the history of Indonesian society. So far, the expanding strategies 
conducted by some political actors have not been successful in 
eliminating the old oligarchs from political processes. The old 
oligarchs continue to succeed in re-organising their power in new 
political contexts. 
Even though the expansion of strategies can be problematic 
for the development of Indonesian democracy, many political 
actors still believe that it can be a better way for transformation 
of Indonesian politics to becoming more democratic. Their 
involvement in an oligarchic/formal politics may lead into gradual 
transformation from inside the system. It is believed this would 
improve political representation in the long term.
Conclusion 
This article demonstrates that contemporary Indonesian 
politics is more open and fragmented but remains dominated by 
oligarchic elites and leaves most societal groups substantively 
unrepresented. However, some societal groups have been pushing 
to open up this oligarchic system by entering the formal political 
arena. This has created the phenomenon of mixed politics in many 
aspects of Indonesian politics. 
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This article concludes that the struggle of political actors to 
gain representation by expanding their strategies has blurred the 
boundaries between state, civil society and political society. The 
effort to expand strategies, however, may bring both positive and 
negative implications for Indonesian democracy. On the one hand, 
the expansion of strategies can be seen as a strong effort of political 
actors to deal with poor political representation as well as to improve 
the quality of democracy. On the other hand, it can potentially 
lead to more complicated problems for Indonesian democracy 
by opening up the possibility for non-democratic oligarchs to 
hijack democratic institutions. Instead of proposing answers 
for the discussed problems, this article shows the complexity of 
contemporary Indonesian politics. Based on the descriptions, it is, 
therefore, important to carry out some further research on how 
mixed politics – the blurring of state, political society, and civil 
society – works. Has this brought significant change to Indonesia’s 
political structure? Or, is it merely a common phenomenon which is 
taking place worldwide? What is its implication for the development 
of democracy in Indonesia?  
This article agrees with Nordholt’s assertion (2003) in which 
social structures and historical paths contribute to contemporary 
Indonesian politics and influence the way political actors develop 
democracy. It is also in line with Shadlen (2004) in that democracy 
makes representation important, but regime change itself cannot 
guarantee representation. 
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